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The Plight of Academic International Law
Phillip R. Trimble*
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hen I entered the academic world almost twenty years ago, one of my

Wobjectives was to change the way public international law was taught, and
more generally how it was understood by the wider community of academics and
practitioners. The subject as presented to me when I was a student had been
dominated by stale theoretical questions having to do with the sources, hierarchical
status, and binding nature of international law, and by a puzzling reverence for the
cases of the International Court of Justice. Even as a student, I sensed that what I was
learning had little to do with the real world of government decision-making politics,
and commerce.
Then, in private law practice on Wall Street, I found that my academic training
had prepared me poorly to deal with the interconnected issues of domestic and
international law, with which I grappled in tax and business planning, foreign
government bond offerings, commercial bank loans, and joint ventures abroad, and all
the associated human problems involving tax, estate, and immigration law. My next
experience-as a lawyer in the Department of State-brought home additional gaps
in international law as it had been presented in the academy, notably its neglect of the
processes by which law was formed and implemented, how those processes related to
the bureaucratic decision-making structures of governments, and the importance of
foreign and domestic constitutional law in shaping realistic options available in any
given situation. My academic training also lacked much consideration of important
things that lawyers actually do in their practices, such as counseling, blending nonlegal/policy considerations with legal analysis in the formation of professional
judgment and advice, and negotiating (both at the intragovernmental and the
intergovernmental levels).
As an academic, I have had the opportunity to reflect on the relevance of my
experience to the academic enterprise, and, perhaps more importantly, the leisure to
contemplate the role of international law in shaping our thinking about the world and
in defining the problems that lawyers are asked to solve. I sought to address the
deficiencies in academic international law as I had experienced them by adjusting the
content of the courses I offered (deviating from the published teaching materials then
available), by eventually authoring a new course book that could correct the problems
that I saw, and by focusing my scholarship on presenting international law in a more
realistic framework that would better reflect the political world in which it operated.

*

Vice Provost for International Studies and Overseas Programs, and Professor of Law, University of
California, Los Angeles. The author would like to express his gratitude to Valeria Vasilevski whose
advice and support have sustained him throughout.

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

I first recast our International Organizations course. The principal casebooks
presented abstract rules and procedures of various organizations, without reference to
context or to the actual impact of these organizations.' The usual approach seemed to
privilege the United Nations (which at the time was a politically marginal institution
of little actual consequence, even for most international lawyers) as the preeminent
example worthy of study. I substituted study of economic institutions-the GATT,
the World Bank and the IMF-and I included material showing how these
organizations worked in practice. Such a topic seemed to me hardly unimportant to
lawyers whose practice could include counseling with respect to their projects or
lobbying these organizations on behalf ofa client, or to academics who might propose
realistic reforms. I also sought to convey a sense of the actual impact of these
institutions on the societies in which they operated, for example, examining the effects
of IMF structural adjustment programs on the price of food in connection with
considering their legal status and legitimacy.
In our Public International Law course, I introduced subject matters that I felt
American lawyers needed to know about.2 These included international law elements
potentially relevant to civil litigation (the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions),
choice of law and choice of forum, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, extraterritorial
application of law, tax treaties and self-executing treaties in general, the potential effect
of Presidential constitutional power, and individual problems associated with
immigration, refugees, and the trans-border movement of persons. Subsequently, I
developed a course book proposal incorporating some of this approach, but the
publisher reported that my colleagues' reaction was simply that they did not teach that
course. Nor did publishers publish such books, so I turned my efforts to working on
another quite successful, if conventionally organized, book.3
I am sorry to report that several generations of casebooks later the situation is
not much better. International law continues to be largely separated from the
domestic legal and political context necessary for complete understanding of the
subject. Treaties are addressed in separate domestic and international chapters, and
the politics at both levels is largely unexamined. Bodies of law and the procedures of
organizations are presented without reference to the impact they have on government
decision-making or on the politics and societies that are affected by them. For
1. See, for example, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., InternationalOrganizations(West 1977); Louis B. Sohn, Cases
on UnitedNations Law (Foundation 2d ed 1967).
Many of my colleagues have commented that my instincts in reaching and scholarship may seem
rather nationalistic or parochial. Perhaps that is true, but I believe that my principal mission in
reaching is to train lawyers, almost all of whom will practice law in the United States, and that my
first obligation is to prepare them to do so. I also feel that presenting international law as the same in
all national contexts is profoundly misleading, both as a theoretical and as an empirical matter. See
Philip R. Trimble, Review Essay, International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 Stan L
Rev 811 (1990). To a lawyer in the world the presentation of international law as an objective,
uniform, cosmopolitan enterprise must seem almost childishly naive.
3. The book, titled InternationalLaw, is co-edited with Professor Barry E. Carter, and is in its third
edition. See Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalLaw (Aspen 3d ed 1999).
2.
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example, flag state jurisdiction and other parts of the law of the sea ignore their effects
on passengers, fisheries, and coastal communities, as if these matters were not
important to understanding the political assumptions underpinning the rules, the
impetus for change, and the general inadequacy of international law-making and
enforcement. Human rights law provides another example of rules and process taught
without the scrutiny of practical effect. In that context, one of the most noteworthy
developments in international relations in the past decade is the increased activity and
importance of Non-Governmental Organizations ('NGOs"), a development whose
implications are hardly considered in the principal casebooks.
Because I am skeptical that academic international lawyers will actually respond
to the training needs of future generations of lawyers, I think that a more realistic
remedy for some of the deficiencies of existing teaching materials is simply to
introduce international law and practice into the relevant courses across the entire
hitherto domestic law curriculum. For example, the U.N. Convention on the Sale of
Goods should be presented in Contracts; the Hague Conventions (and the distinctive
due process issues in transnational litigation) in Civil Procedure; treaties and
Presidential foreign relations power in Constitutional Law; limits on extraterritorial
application of law in Antitrust, Securities Regulation, or Bankruptcy. The
fundamentals of the subject could be introduced in a mini-course of ten or fifteen
hours in the first year of instruction. Of course, a professor will assure you that there
is never enough time to teach her particular subject matter adequately in the time
allotted. Nevertheless, the basic international law doctrine, underlying political
realities and constraints, bureaucratic governmental processes, and issues of
accountability could be readily introduced in a one-unit course. Such a mini-course
could be offered at the beginning of the year and could serve as a prerequisite for all
courses having an international dimension elsewhere in the curriculum. Such a
development would be one step toward addressing the problems of academic
international law.
The shortcomings of pedagogy turn up again in most international law
scholarship, which brings us to the theme of this Symposium. The answer to the
question-"What's Wrong with International Law Scholarship '-of course depends
on what purpose you think scholarship serves and who the audience is. When I
started reading the academic literature twenty years ago the scholarship was
dominated by two styles-positivism and aspirational idealism. The positivist style of
writing mostly described rules and procedures, analyzed ambiguities and
shortcomings, recounted cases or situations where the law had been applied, and
sometimes recommended changes. It assumed that international law existed
independently of context and could be objectively determined. Aspirational idealism
presented international law as a system of rules and principles whose function was to
achieve some valuable objective, such as the elimination of nuclear weapons,
environmental equity, human rights, or some other policy preference of the author.
This approach also ignored real world contexts and treated law as objectively
determinable (provided you have the right values and politics). Neither approach
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seemed especially relevant to, or connected with, the real world of politics,
government, society, and culture. From my perspective, the most significant
shortcoming in the scholarship as I found it twenty years ago was simply that
international law was not connected to its obviously important underlying political
structure-indeed it ignored politics-and the writing paid insufficient attention to
domestic law implications and interconnections.
Now I am pleased to say that the situation has improved substantially. The
positivist tradition continues, but it in fact has an important place in the legal universe;
and there are many current examples of rich and informative writing that serve
significant professional needs. For example, this writing can be quite useful to the
practicing bar, international judges and arbitrators, and a whole range of people who
simply want to be better informed about a subject. It is, of course, true that a major
problem in international law is that there are relatively few such judges and arbitrators
and similarly few practicing lawyers who appear before international tribunals or even
advise private clients on purely international law question. Nevertheless, there is still
an important, if limited, audience of academics, students, government and
intergovernmental organization ("IGO") officials and their lawyers, and NGOs who
may seek basic information and orientation on a particular subject. They have to start
somewhere, and plain descriptive writing serves a purpose in this context. Some recent
and quite impressive manifestations of this style include Hurst Hannumn's Guide to
InternationalHuman Rights Practice4 and, in a more traditional and scholarly vein, Cherif
Bassiouni's monumental description and analysis of the texts comprising international
criminal law, including an exhaustive exposition of their negotiation and background.5
Similarly, last year Johannes Morsink published a painstakingly researched and richly
descriptive account of the origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 and
Arthur Eyffinger did the same with respect to the 1898 Hague Peace Conference.7
These latter three works represent impressive pursuit of knowledge for its own sake;
although without immediate utility or a wide academic audience, they can also be seen
as esoteric exegeses that reinforce the popular image of international law as a fringe
enterprise.
One of the most dramatic changes-and for my taste the most important-is
the increased emphasis in some recent scholarship on relationships between
international and domestic law, the processes of law formation and implementation,
and the underlying interconnections of international law and political culture. In
Hurst Hannum, ed, Guide to InternationalHuman Rights Practice(Transnational 3d ed 1999).
5. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in InternationalLaw (Kluwer 2d ed 1999); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, ed, InternationalCriminalLaw Vols 1-3 (Transnational 2d ed 1999).
6. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Penn

4.

1999).

The 1898 Hague Peace Conference (Kluwer 1999).
8. See Trimble, 42 Stan L Rev 811 (cited in note 2); Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary
International Law, 33 UCLA L Rev 665 (1986); Phillip R. Trimble, Book Review, Legal Scholarship
7. Arthur Eyffinger,

and the ILO, 6 Comp Labor LJ 212 (1984).
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addition to general work at a formal and doctrinal level' several scholars have
emphasized the importance of domestic law and politics, examined the actual
processes of law-making (including studying the roles of non-state actors), and looked
carefully at how international law is actually implemented and obeyed. For example, in
Hannum's Guide, Richard Bilder stressed the critical importance of domestic law in
the actual realization of human rights" and Hannum detailed the importance of
NGOs and the importance of developing techniques for influencing governments." In
a more sophisticated and theoretical way, Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith
examined domestic law and political culture, and challenged much of the accepted
wisdom surrounding United States human rights law practice and the role of
international law in American courts generally 2 In another human rights work
Martha Minow critically examined the knee jerk (from a traditional international law
perspective) "optimal" response to major atrocities, notably the criminal trial of the
oppressors, in light of specific contexts in different societies." The author paid close
attention to the local political, social, cultural, and psychological impacts of a broad
range of possible responses (other than trials) to major atrocities. She thereby
developed a much more realistic picture of the dilemmas involved and the choices that
a society must make. A volume of recent feminist human rights scholarship similarly
examined local social situations, demonstrated the role that law can play in educating
and mobilizing domestic forces for change, and suggested the importance of local
reform. 4 In the field of international environmental law, a recently edited volume
looked at the implementation of, and compliance with, treaty norms in nine countries
in an impressively sharp and detailed way." In a different approach, J.S. Watson
challenged human rights orthodoxy by calling attention to the significant disparity
between law and practice. He looked at the realities of implementation at the
domestic political level, an altogether positive move from my point of view, although
he failed to see the enormous impact that human rights doctrine has had on shaping
domestic political agendas in helping to marshal domestic political movements
(especially associated with the increased importance of NGOs), and changing the way
9.

See, for example, John Rogers, InternationalLaw and United States Law (Ashgare 1999); Jordan Paust,

International Law as Law of the United States (Carolina Acd 1996); Louis Henkin, International Law as
Law in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1555 (1984).
Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in Hurst Hannum, ed, Guide to
InternationalHuman Rights Practice3 (Transnational 3d ed 1999).
11. Hurst Hannum, Implementing Human Rights: An Overview of NGO Strategiesand Available Procedures,in
Hurst Hannum, ed, Guide to InternationalHuman Rights Practice 19 (Transnational 3d ed 1999).
12. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 Fordham L Rev 319 (1997); Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815, 853 (1997).
13. Martha Minnow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence
(Beacon 1998).
14. Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig, eds, Women and International Human Rights Law
(Transnational 1999).
15. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, eds, Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with
InternationalEnvironmentalAccords (MIT 1998).
1o.
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elites think about the political and social world. These works show a healthy respect
for the political, social, and economic impact of international norms and thereby help
establish a sense of reality about the discourse.
In the academy, and especially in the faculty appointments process, there is often
considerable emphasis on scholarship that embodies a broad, theoretical perspective.
This perspective can be important because fresh theoretical writing can elucidate
understanding, challenge assumptions, and change the way the reader thinks about an
issue or even a whole field. Here too, significant progress has been made in the past
two decades. Feminist scholars exposed assumptions and consequences of
international law not much noticed previously. 16 Critical scholars demolished the
positivist basis of the discipline." Others critically evaluated the enterprise in light of
perspectives drawing on moral philosophy." And, addressing the perennial question of
why international law seems to be applied even in the absence of police and military
coercion, Harold Koh articulated an approach that paid close attention to domestic
politics and law and to the realities of how international law operates in the world. 9
Following an interdisciplinary approach, he examined (and critiqued) several strands
of international relations theory, and developed a theory of transnational legal process
that appreciably enriches our thinking.
The Holy Grail of politically-oriented international law scholars has been to
reconnect our discipline with the study of political science and international relations,
a connection lost since at least the 1950s. 20 Some prominent international relations
scholars flatly rejected law as anything worth considering,2 ' while political scientists
generally became mired in methodological thickets as irrelevant as the old positivist
scholarship.' In the past decade, however, the disciplines have been fruitfully reunited.
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Ken Abbott proposed agendas,2' and several scholars have
used the two disciplines to elucidate particular areas of law.24 Most impressively,
16. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International
Law, 85 AmJ Intl L 613 (1991).
17. David Kennedy, InternationalLegal Structures (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1987).
18. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in InternationalLaw and Institutions (Oxford 1995); Thomas M. Franck,

The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford 1990); Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of
International Law, 92 Colum L Rev 53 (1992); Fernando R. Teson, International Obligation and the

21.

Theory of Hypothetical Consent, 15 YaleJ Ind L 84 (1990).
Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L J 2599
(1997).
See Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (Knopf 2d ed 1954); George F. Kennan, American
Diplomacy 1900-50 (Chicago 1951);
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of InternationalPolitics(Addison-Wesley 1979).

22.

Jonathan Cohn, IrrationalExuberance, New Republic 25 (Oct 25, 1999).

23.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 Am J

19.
20.

Ind L 205 (1993); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 Yale J Ind L 335 (1989).

See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S.

Tulumello and Stepan Wood, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generation of
InterdisciplinaryScholarship,92 AmJ Intl L 367 (1998).
24.

Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional
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Michael Byers has studied power and customary international law using a
sophisticated understanding of realism, regime theory, and traditional international
law scholarship to show ways in which law makes a difference in state behavior.'
In conclusion, international law scholarship actually seems to be much improved.
The trajectory shows a healthy regard for what international law means (or does not
mean) to real people in real (domestic) societies. Some writing reflects a necessary
understanding of the importance of local political and social culture, not only for
comprehending the realities surrounding compliance, but also for fashioning strategies
for reform. And finally, we seem to be genuinely assimilating the perspectives of
associated academic disciplines.
The question-"What's Wrong with International Law Scholarship.'-should
be recast. The issue actually is: "What's Wrong with International Law " The answer
is that, as a subject of academic study, it is still too isolated from domestic law and
politics, the dynamic processes (not limited to formal government actions) that
produce its contours and changes, and the social and cultural contexts in which it
must ultimately find its meaning., #'7

Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 Am J Intl L 231 (1997); John Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties:A Synthesis of InternationalRelations Theory ard InternationalLaw, 37 Harv Intl LJ 139 (1996);
Kenneth W. Abbott, 'Trust But Verify:" The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and

OtherInternationalAgreements, 26 Cornell Intl LJ 1 (1993).
25. Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: InternationalRelations and Customary International

Law (Cambridge 1999).
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